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| President of China Xi Jingping and President of Russia Vladimir Putin |
Although it is the world’s second largest economy (third if you include the European Union or Eurozone as a single entity), one of the five Permanent Security Council Members in the United Nations, and a growing military power, China is seen as being a peripheral player in the ongoing Black Sea crisis.
China has no strategic interest in the Black Sea or Eastern Europe, and its economic interests in the area are limited. Yet the Chinese role in this cold war era like game of chess between the Western powers and Russia is greater than most would assume and is indicative of the country’s growing clout and role in the international political theater. However this role comes with a price, one that the Communist government in Beijing has been unwilling to overtly face.
The People’s Republic of China is faced with an international political pickle. On the one hand it could support its BRICS partner Russia in its desire to maintain its hold over the strategic peninsula of Crimea and its political and economic sphere of influence over its next door neighbor Ukraine. On the other hand it could support the fledgling sovereignty of Ukraine and help to facilitate the economic and political sanctions that the United States and its allies are looking to impose on Russia as punishment for its action in Crimea. Neither option sits well with Beijing.
On Saturday the PRC abstained on a Security Council draft resolution, authored by the United States, that would have declared the Crimean Independence Referendum as illegal and called on states and international organizations to ignore the vote. Russia vetoed the resolution, while China abstained. China’s abstention is suggestive of the tight rope between the two polar political positions that the PRC has tried to walk since the beginning of the conflict.
The following is the rationale behind the middle road the middle country (China’s Chinese name is literally translated as middle country) is trying to walk.
International
For the last few decades China has taken the international position that the political sovereignty of each state should be respected by all international actors. It has constantly found itself an international political ally in Russia in proffering such a position. However, the current Crimean crisis and referendum has created a paradox for the traditional Chinese position and alignment.
The PRC has consistently opposed the intervention of alien actors in the internal functions of sovereign states. As an emerging power that faced the brunt of the colonial abuse on its sovereignty less than a century ago, it is no wonder why China has taken the international position of protecting the internal sovereignty of each state. It is the reason why it has impeded any and all Western intervention in Syria, criticized the Libyan expedition, and dragged its feet in responding to Iran’s nuclear program.
China has also opposed what it sees as Western strong arming that results in the unceremonious separation of sovereign territory from the parent state. The animosity towards such actions stems from colonial times, when the West forcibly annexed territory from the Qing Dynasty such as Hong Kong and Macau and the Japanese created the puppet state of Manchuko in Manchuria during World War 2, and more recently as a reaction to the United States’s military, economic and political support of an autonomous and independent Taiwan which the PRC still considers to be a part of mainland. China’s opposition to the independence of Kosovo is an example of this animosity and the resulting opposition.
Crimea posses a diplomatic problem for the People’s Republic, as it finds itself at political odds with its BRICS partner. On the one hand Russia has been a staunch ally of China’s who together have stood as a bulwark against unchecked American and European political and economic dominance of the world. Together they offer other states an alternative to the Western system and the demands of the Western nations, and serve as the primary impediment to a uni-polar political world.
However, Russia’s involvement in Crimea is a direct violation of the traditional Chinese international political position. It has illegally and extraterritorially inserted itself into internal Ukrainian affairs by deploying its military on sovereign Ukrainian soil, and has sanctified the possibility of removing the territory of a state from its parent country.
Were China to diplomatically confront Russia over these perceived violations of its positions it would risk the political partnership the two nations have forged, and risk further China’s ability to find a reliable and feasible partner to balance America’s political will around the world.
Domestic
The Crimean conundrum becomes more complicated when considering China’s domestic considerations.
On one side of the debate China abhors the principal of
self-determination, which the recent Crimean referendum celebrates. Two
particular western Chinese provinces, Tibet and Xinjiang and to a lesser extent
the provinces of Inner Mongolia and Ningxia as well, have large minority
populations which have been vocally against what they perceive to be a Chinese
occupation of their territory since the mid 20th century.
Both areas have large internationally known independence
movements. It is ironic that just this past week marked the 51st anniversary of
the Tibetan uprising in Tibet and just a few weeks ago a group of Turkish
Uyghurs, the Muslim ethnic group that makes up the majority of Xinjiang
province, committed a terrorist attack in the city of Kunming, Yunnan province,
allegedly as a retaliation for the Chinese occupation.
The Crimean referendum supports the prospect of
self-determination, in allowing for regional ethnic groups to decide whether or
not to be an independent state or possibly join another state. Support for this
event would undermine China’s position in both Tibet and Xinjiang and would
further upset its authority in both areas.
Additionally a successful partition of Crimea from Ukraine could
serve as an impetuous for the Uyghur and Tibetan independence movements. An
independent Crimea would both embolden and serve as a rallying cry for those
ethnic groups to cause the destabilizing protests which the People's Republic
of China fears within its own territory.
Further east, however, the Crimean vote could potentially have a
positive impact on Chinese international and domestic policies.
To the east of the People’s Republic of China the island of Taiwan
has been an independent, autonomous and sovereign state free from communist
rule since the Guomindang fled across the Taiwan Straits in 1949. The Republic
of China, otherwise known as Taiwan, has since been an island state with a
majority Han Chinese population separated from the mainland for half a century.
Taiwan and Crimea are similar in that they are both regions with
an ethnic majority that are detached from their ancestral homeland. Both
regions are claimed to have historically been within the territory of the
ethnic ancestral homeland.
Whereas in Western China the Crimean vote may influence feelings
of self-determination, in Taiwan the vote may serve to influence a movement of
unification of unification. It may be the hope of the People’s Republic of
China that the Crimean vote may be persuasive to the Taiwanese population and
serve as an example to reintegrate Taiwan back into the political and
governmental structure of the mainland.
Why China Matters
With the Crimean Referendum for Independence, and Russia’s
subsequent recognition of that independence, the United States and the European
Union has and will continue to impose economic sanctions on Russia.
In retaliation to the sanctions the Russian government could respond
by shutting off the flow of both natural gas and crude oil to Europe. While
Europe, especially Eastern Europe, relies heavily on the importation of Russian
oil and gas, the Russian economy relies even more on the exportation of those products
to the West.
The Russian economy has been revitalized since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in the early 1990s, thanks in large part to the growing energy
sector fueled by the European demand for crude oil and natural gas. Russia is
the largest exporter of natural gas in the world and is a net exporter of crude
oil.
Without access to the European market the Russian energy sector
will be left with a dearth of demand to meet its supply. Outside of the
European and Western markets, there are only two markets that could supply the
demand that’s needed to continue the growth of the Russian economic. Both India
and China have large populations with a growing economy which can substitute
the loss of the European markets.
While India has the demand for Russia’s energy, the logistics of
providing the supply is extraordinarily difficult. All of the existing Russian
pipelines go through Eastern Europe, as well as the Caucuses and Central Asia
on its way to Europe. There are currently no existing pipelines that reach
India from Russia’s vast Eastern territory. To reach India the Russian energy
sector would have to either build new pipelines through central Asia in
countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the Hindu Kush Mountain
range, or transport the products by sea.
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| From BBC News |
To reach India by land, the Russian pipeline would have to cross
through Afghanistan and Pakistan and territories in those states which are
under the control of the Taliban and far away from the protection of the
government. Additionally, the Hindu Kush is a mountain range that has some of
the highest altitudes in the world making such a crossing extremely difficult
and expensive.
Alternatively, Russian oil and gas can reach India by Sea, but
would have to be loaded onto ships in the Black Sea since the Russian pipelines
do not reach its Pacific coast. Transiting oil and gas through the Black Sea
would subject the transit to possible Western blockades of the Bosporus and
Dardanelles Straits in Turkey as well as pressure from the Egyptian government
if they were to close down the Suez canal to Russian shipments.
China is the more logistical and likely sources of any Russian
surplus of oil and gas. Two oil and gas pipelines are already proposed to be
built from the Russian interior to the Chinese market. The proposed pipelines
could easily transverse the Russian and Mongolian plains to reach Central and
Northeastern China.
While the construction and completion of the pipeline would not
commence or finish in time to stave off the initial blow to the Russian
economy, it would have a profound and significant impact on the future world
economy and politics.
A Sino-Russo pipeline would alleviate the pressure that the
European Union could apply on the Russian economy through oil and gas embargoes
or sanctions. Diversifying its customer base would also free Russia, as an
international actor, to enact a foreign policy without the fear of economic
reprisal.
In such a scenario China must decide whether empowering Russia’s
economic base is worth the risk of alienating the United States and European
Union, while possibly instigating revolts and independence movements in the
western part of the country.
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