Stuck Between a Rocket and A Hard Place: Why The IDF Inflicts So Much Collateral Damage




Smoke from an Israeli strike in Gaza City. Picture: Lefteris Pitarakis.

There has been death and destruction on both sides of this most recent conflict between Israel and Hamas, but Palestinian casualties have far outpaced that of the Israelis and the majority of the Palestinians killed have been civilians.

International sentiment has echoed the growing disparity between the two casualty lists. Allegations of war crime atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have followed. Arguments from third party actors and observers focus on the asymmetric nature of the conflict. Israel does posses an overwhelming technological military superiority over Hamas. Its air force operates with impunity over the skies of the Gaza Strip, and its artillery is capable of unleashing a relentless barrage of munitions from positions of relative safety; whereas Hamas’s weaponry is limited to small arms and rockets. On top of its offensive capabilities Israel possesses the Iron Dome defensive system which has neutralized hundreds if not thousands of rockets fired from Gaza.

Considering the gap in military capabilities it is not surprising to see an incongruity in the casualty count. However, the growing concern over the fighting has been focused on the disproportionate ratio of Hamas militants to civilians killed during this operation. Estimates by some NGOs and media outlets put the ratio of civilians killed during Operation Protective Edge (OPE) at about 75% of the total Palestinian casualty count. The high percentage of civilian deaths is also not surprising considering the denser urban area where the fighting is occurring, and the choice of weaponry being used by Israel during this conflict.

Israel’s selection and usage of weapons during an operation in a dense urban environment has been the catalyst for the aforementioned allegations. Many accuse the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) of committing war crimes by actively targeting civilians and using indiscriminate weapons in areas densely populated by civilians; while Israel, and its supporters, counter by arguing that the high civilian casualty rate is a result of Hamas using civilians as human shields. The recent shelling of UN run schools in the Gaza Strip, as well as other aerial, mortar, and artillery attacks, have called into question the legitimacy of the claims made by the Israeli government.  

In short Israel doesn’t affirmatively target civilians, but the weaponry that it decides to use within the Gaza Strip does exponentially increase the likelihood of collateral damage; in turn, the weaponry Israel decides to use is a product of its military doctrine which was developed to cope with the environment it is forced to survive in.  

Equipment

During Operation Protective Edge, Israel has employed the use of a wide assortment of military equipment. Of specific importance is the IDF's land based equipment.



A Soltam M-71 howitzer.

Israel's military uses the Soltam M-71 and the American made M109 howitzers as the centerpieces of its artillery arsenal. The M-71 is a stationary gun while the M109 is self propelled, or vehicular. Both weapons are 155mm caliber howitzers and have a maximum range of 23.5 kilometers (14.6 miles). Like all artillery weapons the purpose of the M-71 and M109 is to fire large projectiles at enemy positions from locations of relative safety far away from the area of combat.

To put the 14.6 miles into perspective an M-71 or an M109 based at the most northern end of the island of Manhattan (in the Inwood neighborhood on the banks of the Harlem river) could hit a target  at the southern most end of the island in and around Battery Park. At its widest point the Gaza Strip is only 11 km (6.8 miles) long which means that the IDF can station artillery units and equipment well within Israeli territory, where it will be safe from counter battery attacks from Hamas, and fire un-impeded into the strip. The extensive range that these howitzers posses guarantees that every time they are used they will be fired out of direct sight of the intended target.

The Gaza Strip.

Issues over the IDF's use of the M-71s and M109s arises over the accuracy of the weapons. Both artillery pieces have a margin of error which ranges between 200 and 300 meters. Add the ordnance's lethal radius of about 150 meters from the point of impact and an artillery shell can spread shrapnel approximately 450 meters from its intended target. In dense urban areas 450 meters can mean the difference between striking an enemy combatant and hitting a civilian's home.

That being said artillery units can be precise and highly effective weapons when operated by well trained and experienced soldiers in a relatively calm (weather) environment. However, the variables are always changing. Wind conditions at the target site can vary from the wind conditions at the point of origin. The large amount of distance that the ordnance has to cover means that the projectile can encounter several atmospheric variations which can alter its intended trajectory. Even a slight alteration can shift the point of impact a few meters from the target point.

In addition to artillery the IDF also employs the use of ordinances from air and armor. Unlike with its artillery units, projectiles fired from these weapons are usually done so with a line of sight to the intended target. Missile strikes from aircraft are also guided giving the Israeli Air Force a level of precision in carrying out strikes on its targets.

But the problem remains that while the strikes themselves may be precise the subsequent explosion and damage rarely are. There is no way for the IDF to gather enough data to accurately predict how an airstrike or an ordnance from one of its tanks will impact the target and the surrounding area. Let's say that the IDF wishes to target a building on a block in Gaza, the building may be structurally deficient due to the lack of resources from the blockade or wear and tear from previous conflicts. It may also be supporting surrounding buildings which are under the same type of stress as the targeted building. An IDF armor division targets the second floor of the building with an unguided projectile and hits its target. The damage that occurs causes a cascading reaction destroying half of the targeted building and causing severe damage to the building next door. The cascading damage from the initial target causes the large scale collateral damage that is being categorized as indiscriminate destruction in Gaza .

Destroyed home in the Gaza Strip. From the AP.

Using air, artillery and armor in an urban environment is not a war crime on its face. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions Articles 51 and 54 outlaw indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations in addition to the targeting of non-military installations and structures. This includes using weapons on legitimate military targets that will have a greater than likely chance of indiscriminately affecting a civilian population near the area of impact. Even though the Protocol does attempt to define an indiscriminate attack, as well as the weapons that cause indiscriminate damage, the standards of review are cloudy at best. There is no rubric or set of guidelines which international observers can use to determine whether a war crime has occurred or when a legal artillery attack becomes an indiscriminate attack and violation of international law. On top of that war is inherently chaotic and the activities that take place during combat are almost impossible to narrow into defined categories.  

It is also worth noting that Israel is not a party to Protocol 1 and has never sought to bind itself to the provisions of the treaty. Other actors that have failed or refused to ratify Protocol 1 include the United States, India, and Indonesia. Of particular irony, as centers of the growing vocal accusations of Israeli war crimes in the current conflict, neither Turkey or Iran have signed on to Protocol 1. However, Israel's lack of commitment to Protocol 1 does not excuse it from all liability when it comes to the protection of non-combatants in the areas of IDF operations. International legal norms have emerged regarding the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and Israel has unilaterally bound itself to a limit civilian casualties and indiscriminate attacks (although the extent of that bind is arguable).

Military Doctrine

So why is Israel using this equipment in the densely populated Gaza Strip?

In response to the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967 Israel launched a six day military operation  where it captured the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan, and both the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. What is known as the Six-Day War was a catastrophe for the Arabic states where the IDF humiliated the national armies of the aforementioned nations through superior and more effective air power. When Egypt, Syria and Lebanon launched a surprise offensive in 1973 Israel’s armored units and artillery power not only staved off disaster but once again humiliated the Syrian and Egyptian armies in the Sinai and Golan Heights.  The effectiveness of the IDF’s air, armor, and artillery elements proved decisive in both of Israel’s victories even though the Jewish state was out-manned, outgunned and out-supplied.  

Israeli artillery during the Yom Kippur War. From The Bloody Valley
of Tears Battle - IDF Flickr

Recalling the success of these units in 67’ and 73’, Israeli military doctrine has since been based on a concept where its Air Force, tank, and artillery divisions are the focal point of all IDF military operations, while the infantry takes a back seat to the other elements. Considering most nations structure their military doctrine to play to their strengths, the doctrine is logically sound. During the 18^th, 19^th and first half of the 20^th century the British structured their military to emphasize their naval strength. Asserting the strategy of its sheer size, the Soviet Union formulated a doctrine based on land combat and invested heavily in building armored units leaving its successor state, Russia, with more tanks than the combined militaries of the United States and People’s Republic of China.

While strategically sound for conventional warfare this concept of playing to a state’s military strength does not conform to the humanitarian etiquette in unconventional war. Unlike in conventional warfare, unconventional warfare requires surgical operations to eliminate enemies that operate within civilian populations. Logically civilians aren't enemy combatants and shouldn't be punished for living in areas where terrorists operate. Legally nations are bound by the post-World War II conventions which limit the target of civilians.

Militaries around the world have struggled to adopt new combat doctrines and adapt to the new realities of war. The United States military was caught off guard after the initial invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq and found its traditional military structure deficient during the subsequent years of occupation in both countries. Eventually both the U.S. Army and Marine Corp were able to adapt by relying on smaller operational units.

Although Israel has entered into peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan it is still in a state of de facto war with Lebanon and Syria. Additionally, it is under constant threat from non-neighboring Muslim nations, such as Iran, who do not recognize Israel’s right to exist and constantly make references to the destruction of the Jewish state. Even its peace agreement with Egypt is tenuous and can easily shift with the political climate in the country. It is the threat that the conventional armies of these Muslim nations pose for which the IDF is structured to combat not the urban environments of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel's Modern Urban Warfare facility in the Negev.

This is not to say that the IDF lacks training in operating in urban environments. In the northern reaches of the Negev desert the IDF operates one of the most, if not the most, advanced urban warfare training facilities in the world. Israeli soldiers who train at the facility are instructed in the art of urban combat and are taught to distinguish between civilian and militant targets. Regardless of the infantry's readiness to operate in an urban environment the military will continue to resort to the use of air, artillery, and armor as a central ingredient in any military engagement.

As previously discussed the IDF's past victories in the 60s and 70s was due in large part to its superiority in air, artillery, and armor. But more importantly it was the IDF's ability to integrate its air, artillery, and armor with the rest of its military, its combined armed skills, in operations where they were outnumbered and outgunned by the enemy. Israel fears that any shift in its method of engagement to adopt a more urban friendly doctrine would negatively affect its ability to coordinate the use of the different elements of its military in an effective tactical engagement. In short, the IDF doesn't want to change its military protocol to lower the risk of collateral damage in the Gaza Strip at the risk of losing its edge in combined armed skills and capabilities.

Shifts in military doctrines and engagement methodology has been widespread in many Western militaries at the beginning of the millennium. Facing new realities in combat, NATO forces in Afghanistan and Coalition forces in Iraq were forced to adapt their tactical protocols to fight an enemy within an urban environment. That shift required new training, and a new methodology centering on the use of smaller infantry units without the same support from artillery and armored units that they would have received in the past. The changing doctrinal and training landscape have many in the United States questioning the military's preparedness for a conventional war with a state like Russia or China. Last week a member of the British Parliament questioned NATO's readiness to engage Russia in a conventional war due to the escalating tensions in Ukraine.

2009 Israeli Artillery Strike in the Gaza Strip. From the AFP.

The effectiveness of the IDF's own combined armed capabilities have atrophied since 2000. Israel withdrew its forces from Southern Lebanon in 2000, effectively ending a prolonged military campaign that it had been engaged in since the early 1980s. The withdrawal coincided with the beginning of the Second Intifada where Israel responded by redeploying its military to wage a mostly ground campaign in the West Bank. Focusing on urban combat, the IDF forwent its typical operational guidelines and engaged the uprising with a smaller infantry force in more surgical engagements. Israel's 2006 operation in Southern Lebanon and 2008 Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip showed that after years of focusing on urban combat the effectiveness of the IDF's combined armed capabilities had decreased.

During the campaigns in Southern Lebanon and Cast Lead Israel fought Hezbollah and Hamas, two terrorist organizations engaged in un-conventional warfare, and not the standing armies of other countries. For Israel, the greatest threat to its survival comes from other states not terrorist groups. While terrorist organizations such as Hamas pose a safety threat to its civilian population nations such as Iran and Syria pose an existential threat to the existence of Israel itself. Watching the atrophy in its own combined armed skills and that of the United States and its other European allies, Israel is unwilling to change its military doctrine at the risk of decreasing the effectiveness of the IDF's abilities to cope with conventional threats. In all likelihood Israel will remain heavily dependent on the use of air, artillery, and armor elements of its military during OPE and future operations in the Gaza Strip. As a result the collateral damage from those operations and the ratio of civilian deaths will continue to be high.

In the end Israel is stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand it fears for the combat readiness of the IDF to engage an enemy in a conventional war. On the other hand it is obligated to defend its citizens from unconventional armed attacks using conventional military methods. The result is the acceptance of a military doctrine born out of the perceived necessity of survival formed from the environment Israel is forced to exist in, for which the civilians in Gaza pay a high price.